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Russia’s Cases in the ECtHR and the Question of Implementation 
Bill Bowring 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter starts and finishes with events at the time of writing and revision. 
The question concerns the nature and quality of Russia’s engagement, for twenty 
years now, with the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Since I started work on this chapter in June 2015, dramatic events have 
taken place. I submitted a draft in January 2016, shortly after the enactment in 
December 2015 of the law enabling the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation (Russian CC) to rule on the possibility or impossibility of 
implementation of a judgment of the ECtHR. This was described by 
commentators as marking a decisive break from international law and European 
human rights.1 I explore this development in the first section of this chapter. 
But since then the Russian CC on 19 April 2016 issued its judgment on its 
newly acquired powers to refuse the implementation of the rulings of the ECtHR 
contradicting the Russian Constitution (RF Constitution). The case under review 
                                                          
1 See  in  this chapter my references to comments by Halya Coynash and Vladimir Kara-Murza. 
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was Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia2 on prisoners’ voting rights. As I show in 
this chapter, this judgment attempted to leave open the possibility by Russia of 
compliance with the Strasbourg judgment. 
On 19 January 2017, however, the Russian CC issued its long-awaited 
judgment in the Yukos case3, concerning the 2014 judgment of the Strasbourg 
Court on just satisfaction, ordering Russia to “pay the applicant company’s 
shareholders as they stood at the time of the company’s liquidation and, as the 
case may be, their legal successors and heirs EUR 1,866,104,634 (one billion, 
eight hundred sixty six million, hundred and four thousand, six hundred thirty 
four euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary 
damage.” This judgment, whose significance is still being assessed at the time of 
writing, can be said to have stretched the meaning of “impossibility” 
impermissibly far. I turn to this judgment in the final section of this chapter and 
to the two powerful dissenting opinions, published a few days later, by judges 
Yaroslavtsev and Aranovskiy. 
Can this be said to demonstrate the failure of attempts to “socialize” 
Russia into the ECHR system? 
To answer this question, I turn first to an examination of the “spiral 
model” of socialization4 that, starting (to my surprise) with an explanation of the 
                                                          
2 Applications nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05, Judgment of 14 July 2013. 
3 OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Application No. 14902/04, Judgment (just 
satisfaction) of 31 July 2014, at, for example, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw7752.pdf (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
4 See Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.) The Power of Human Rights: 
International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and 
see Gerald Robert Pace “Human Rights from Paper to Practice: How Far Have We Come? A 
Review of The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change” v. 1 n. 1 
(2001) Human Rights and Human Welfare, pp. 9–11, at 
http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/volumes/2001/1-1/risse.pdf (accessed on 29 January 2017), 
and Beth Simmons “From Ratification to Compliance: Quantitative Evidence on the Spiral Model” 
in Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (eds.) The Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to 
Compliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 43–59, at 
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Soviet understanding of the role of law as social educator, has migrated from 
developmental psychology to constructivist theories of international relations, 
and thence to human rights law, with special reference to Russia. 
Next, I give an overview of what has been a deep and significant 
engagement between Russia and the ECtHR and point to recent scholarly 
publications that confirm my own view that this engagement, while it has not 
turned Russia into the Netherlands or Norway, has brought about real change. I 
then report on and analyze the two recent judgments of the Russian CC. 
Finally, in my conclusion, I illustrate my thesis that the character of 
Russian approaches to law, and in particular international law and human rights, 
can only be understood in the context of the intense and unfinished debates that 
have continued from the eighteenth century to the present day, with the 
extraordinary debate in 2015 between Yelena Lukyanova and Valeriy Zorkin. 
6.2 Act One: Amending the Law on the Constitutional Court 
On 14 December 2015 President Putin signed the Federal Law “On enacting 
amendments to the Federal constitutional law on the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation.”5 One headline on the day of signature read, “Putin approved 
a law permitting the non-implementation of decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights.”6 The Law came into force on its publication on 15 December 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bsimmons/files/chapter_3_quant_ev_on_spiral_model.pdf 
(accessed on 29 January 2017). 
5 Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 14 декабря 2015 г. N 7-ФКЗ “О внесении 
изменений в Федеральный конституционный закон “О Конституционном Суде Российской 
Федерации” (Federalniy zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 14 Dekabrya 2015 N 7-FKZ “O vnesenii 
izmeneniy v Federalniy konstitutionniy zakon “O Konstitutsionnom Sude Rossiiskoi Federatsii”). 
6 http://newsru.com/russia/15dec2015/podpisal.html (accessed on 29 December 2015). 
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2015 in the Russian Gazette7. It amends Article 3(3) of the Federal Law of the 
Constitutional Court so as to give the Court the jurisdiction to decide the 
question on the possibility (vozmozhnost) of implementing the decision of an 
international organ for the protection of the rights and freedoms of the person; 
the Court can declare “possibility” or “impossibility.” 
The word “possibility” is not defined. I will turn to its deployment in the 
Court’s Resolution of 14 July 2015 in the context of the judgment of the ECtHR in 
Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia of 14 July 2013,8 the Russian Hirst v. UK,9 and 
the recent Yukos judgment. 
It should be noted that the State Duma’s own lawyers had expressed 
concerns10 as to the legality of the amendments in the context of the following 
1. Article 15(4) of the RF Constitution of 1993, according to which 
international treaties ratified by Russia have priority over domestic 
law; 
2. Article 1 of the Federal Law of 30 March 1998 No. 54-FZ on 
Ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights; and 
3. the Ruling of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation (RF Supreme Court) of 27 June 2013 “On the Application 
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights...” 
                                                          
7 http://www.rg.ru/2015/12/15/ks-site-dok.html (accessed on 29 December 2015). 
8 Application Nos. 11157/04 and 15162/05. 
9 Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No 2) [2005] ECHR 681, Application No. 74025/01, Judgment 
(Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2005. 
10 Anna Pushkarskaya “Duma Staff Lawyers Have Criticised the Amendments to the Law on the 
CC on the Conditions of Non-Implementation of the Decisions of the ECtHR” 1 December 2015 
Kommersant at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2866415 (accessed on 29 December 2015). 
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It is quite clear that Russian courts in the system of Courts of General Jurisdiction 
headed by the RF Supreme Court are obliged to implement Strasbourg 
judgments. 
The response of some observers was apocalyptic in tone: this was the end 
of Russia’s participation in international law. Halya Coynash wrote on 2 
December 2015 under the headline, “Russia Moves to legislate impunity from 
international law,” that “there seems every reason to suspect that the law will be 
invoked whenever Moscow does not wish to comply with international law.”11 
The headline of the commentary by Vladimir Kara-Murza of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky’s Open Russia, writing on 24 December 2015 in World Affairs 
Journal, was “Putin ‘Outlaws’ European Justice in Russia.”12 
Last week, Vladimir Putin signed a law that effectively banishes international 
legal norms from Russian territory and denies Russian citizens access to 
European justice. The measure, overwhelmingly passed in both houses of 
Russia’s rubber-stamp Parliament, gives the Constitutional Court—whose 
chairman, Valery Zorkin, recently called for “transforming the legal system in 
the direction of military harshness”—the right to ignore rulings by the European 
Court of Human Rights by declaring them “non-executable.” 
On 19 December 2015, Philip Leach and Alice Donald wrote under the headline: 
“Russia Defies Strasbourg: Is Contagion Spreading?”13 This was a reference to 
their article of 21 November 2013, “Hostility to the European Court and the risks 
of contagion,”14 which focused not on Russia but on the United Kingdom’s 
position. They quoted the former President of the European Court, Sir Nicolas 
Bratza, who had expressed his concern about the risks of contagion: 
There is a risk of this attitude in the UK to judgments of the Court negatively 
impacting on other states and complaints being made of double standards … 
                                                          
11 http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1449011289 (accessed on 29 December 2015). 
12 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/vladimir-kara-murza/putin-
%E2%80%98outlaws%E2%80%99-european-justice-russia (accessed on 29 December 2015). 
13 http://www.ejiltalk.org/russia-defies-strasbourg-is-contagion-spreading/ (accessed on 29 
December 2015). 
14 http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/11/21/hostility-to-the-european-court-and-the-risks-
of-contagion-philip-leach-and-alice-donald/ (accessed on 29 December 2015). 
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[which] could result in a wider refusal to implement ECtHR judgments across 
the Council of Europe. (p. 176) 
And they referred to the Commissioner for Human Rights of the CoE, Nils 
Muižnieks, who suggested in a memorandum to Nick Gibb MP that 
continued non-compliance would have far-reaching deleterious consequences; 
it would send a strong signal to other member states, some of which would 
probably follow the UK’s lead and also claim that compliance with certain 
judgments is not possible, necessary or expedient. That would probably be the 
beginning of the end of the ECHR system, which is at the core of the Council of 
Europe.15 
Their fears of “contagion” seemed to be confirmed by the new Russian law. In 
their view, it did not “simply concern the relationship between the Strasbourg 
Court and the domestic courts (reflecting, for example, the long-standing debate 
in the UK about the implications of [s]ection 2 of the Human Rights Act).”16 It 
went, they asserted, much further than that. It denied the enforceability of ECtHR 
judgments as regards the Russian state altogether, thereby purporting to 
extinguish the effect of Article 46 of the ECHR, unprecedented in the history of 
the European human rights regime. 
The response of the CoE was more measured. On 15 December 2015 the 
Secretary General of the CoE, Thorbjørn Jagland, said: 
[I]t will be up to the Constitutional Court of Russia to ensure respect for the 
Convention if it is called upon to act under the new provisions. The Council of 
Europe will only be able to assess Russia’s compliance with its obligations when 
and if a specific case arises. The compatibility of Strasbourg judgments with the 
national constitutions has been examined in some other member States. So far, 
countries have always been able to find a solution in line with the Convention. 
This should also be possible in Russia.17 
                                                          
15 Nils Muižnieks “Observations for the Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) 
Bill” 10 October 2013, at 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&Instran
etImage=2933800&SecMode=1&DocId=2062696&Usage=2 (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
16 http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/11/21/hostility-to-the-european-court-and-the-risks-
of-contagion-philip-leach-and-alice-donald/ (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
17 http://www.coe.int/en/web/secretary-general/news/-
/asset_publisher/EYlBJNjXtA5U/content/russia-s-new-law-on-the-constitutional-court-jagland-
a-solution-should-be-possible-/16695?desktop=true  (accessed on21 July 2017). 
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The reference by Kara-Murza was to the speech of Valeriy Zorkin, the Chairman 
of the Russian CC18 on 24 November 2015 for a legal forum in Moscow, in the 
context of Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian fighter plane that day.19 Zorkin’s 
remarks were discussed by Anna Pushkarskaya and Viktor Khamraev in 
Kommersant on 25 November 2015, under the headline “Valeriy Zorkin is Ready 
for Tougher Russian Laws in Conditions of ‘Military Harshness.’”20 They referred 
to Zorkin as saying that a dilemma as to the necessity of a choice between 
freedom and security was senseless. Security was one of the most important 
human freedoms, therefore the state may “limit other freedoms” and could 
“transform the legal system in the direction of military harshness, so as to 
exclude in present circumstances the risk of forgetting about human rights in the 
midst of the struggle against terrorism.”21 
I will return to Zorkin’s sometimes unfortunate interventions later in this 
chapter. 
6.3 Legal Socialization and Russia 
At this point I turn, critically, to some pertinent features of the “socialization” 
thesis that is a theme of this collection. 
Ironically, perhaps, one of the first applications of the concept of “legal 
socialization” appeared in the works of Harold J Berman on Soviet law, from 
                                                          
18 Chairman of the Russian CC from 29 October 1991 to 6 October 1993, and again from 21 March 
2003 to the present. See biography (in Russian), at http://tass.ru/tass-dos-e-rossiya/564929 
(accessed on 29 January 2017). 
19 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34912581 (accessed on 29 December 2015). 
20 http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2861672 (accessed on 29 December 2015). See also 




1963 onwards.22 In their seminal article, “Legal Socialization: Strategies for an 
Ethical Legality,”23 June Louin Tapp and Felice J. Levine pointed out, “[t]he 
respective legal and psychological works of Berman24 and Bronfenbrenner,25 for 
example, on the United States and the Soviet Union, describe the allocation of 
‘social’ education functions to other than customary socializing agents.” They 
continued that in respect of the Soviet Union: 
Berman described the function of law (especially through the courts) as an 
agent of socialization for the entire citizenry, educating the public to societal 
values and legal expectations. In a revealing comparison in Justice in the USSR, 
at pages 333–4, he reported similar ordinances in the U.S.S.R. (from the mid-
1930’s) and two towns in the state of Oregon (from the 1940’s) that prescribed 
parents’ moral and legal responsibility to bring up (i.e., socialize) their children 
for honesty and conformity to law. 
In his 1972 article Berman used the word “socialization” twice. First, he 
compared two models of adjudication: “In the first model litigation is seen as a 
contest among equals, with the judge acting as an umpire; in the second model, 
litigation is seen as a process of socialization, with the judge acting as a parent 
and the litigants as children,”26 while later on, referring directly to the Soviet 
approach, he wrote: 
To appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of the educational 
role of the court requires a consideration of the processes by which people learn 
to think and act in ways considered desirable by the society in which they live. 
Psychologists have studied this in terms of the socialisation of children.27 
                                                          
22 Harold Berman Justice in the USSR (revised ed. Harvard University Press, 1963); Berman “The 
Educational Role of the Soviet Court” v. 21 n. 1 (1972) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, pp. 81–94; Berman “The Use of Law to Guide People to Virtue: A Comparison of Soviet 
and American Perspectives” in J. Tapp and F. Levine (eds.) Law, Justice, and the Individual in 
Society: Psychological and Legal Issues (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1977). 
23 v. 27, n. 1 (1974) Stanford Law Review, pp. 1–72. 
24 Berman Justice in the USSR; Berman “The Educational Role of the Soviet Court,” pp. 81–94 (this 
was his lecture the previous year at University College, London); Berman “The Use of Law to 
Guide People to Virtue.” 
25 Urie Bronfenbrenner Two Worlds of Childhood: US and U.S.S.R. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1970); Bronfenbrenner “Soviet Methods of Character Education: Some Implications for 
Research” 57 (1962)Religious Educational Research Supplement, p. 345. 
26 Berman “The Educational Role of the Soviet Court,” pp. 81–94, at p. 82. 
27 Ibid., p. 93. 
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Indeed, the concept of legal socialization had its roots in research into 
educational and developmental psychology. How has this concept migrated to 
international law? 
The answer is to be found in the pronounced turn of the international 
relations theory in the last two decades toward “social constructivism.”28 
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink first developed the concept of 
“socialization” in this context in 1999 in the edited volume The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change.29 In their chapter 1, “The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: 
Introduction,” they introduced “socialization” as the “process by which 
international norms are internalized and implemented domestically.”30 They 
developed a “five-phase spiral model’’ of norms socialization that specifies the 
causal mechanisms and the logic of action prevailing in each phase of the 
socialization process.31 They were explicit as to the character of social 
constructivism: 
While materialist theories emphasize economic or military conditions or 
interests as determining the impact of ideas in international and domestic 
politics, social constructivists emphasize that ideas and communicative 
processes define in the first place which material factors are perceived as 
relevant and how they influence understandings of interests, preferences, and 
political decisions.32 
This is how the developmental psychology concept of “socialization” finds its 
way into the study of human rights: states are treated as if they were people, and 
the interaction of states and international instruments and mechanisms is 
explained wholly in the realm of ideas. Social constructivism is “idealist.” By 
                                                          
28 For my own critique of this trend, see Bill Bowring “What is Realism in International Law and 
Human Rights?” in Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (eds.) Scientific Realism and International 
Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 101–14. 
29 Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink The Power of Human Rights:. 
30 Ibid., p. 5. 
31 Ibid., p. 6. 
32 Ibid., pp. 6–7. 
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contrast, my approach can be described as “materialist” or “realist,” or, to put it 
another way, Marxian33; that is, I am interested in states and institutions as 
historically determined and causally effective. 
In 2004 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks published their article, “How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,”34 in which 
they introduced the notion of “acculturation, whereby conformity is elicited 
through a range of socialization processes.”35 Their conclusion, drawing from 
Risse and Sikkink, was as follows: “We suggest that a central problem for human 
rights regimes is how best to socialize ‘bad actors’ to incorporate globally 
legitimated models of state behavior and how to get ‘good actors’ to perform 
better.”36 In 2005 Harold Hongju Koh responded in the same journal with 
“Internalization through Socialization.”37 He hailed the dramatic change “less 
than two decades ago, when international law finally met international relations 
theory.”38 
Jose Alvarez also responded in the same issue of the Duke Law Journal 
with “Do States Socialize?”39 His informed and sympathetic critique concluded 
with the following rather pertinent comment: 
[A]cculturation as presently described may not in the end advance Goodman 
and Jinks’s ultimate goals as much as they would like. It is not at all clear that the 
                                                          
33 Friedrich Engels wrote in 1890: “Just as Marx used to say, commenting on the French ‘Marxists’ 
of the late [18]70s: ‘All I know is that I am not a Marxist.’” See Engels to C. Schmidt, in Berlin, 
London, 5 August 1890, at 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1890/letters/90_08_05.htm (accessed on 29 
January 2017). 
34 Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks “How to Influence States: Socialization and International 
Human Rights Law” v. 54 n. 3 (2004) Duke Law Journal, pp. 621–703; see also Goodman and 
Jinks “Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law” v. 19 n. 4 (2008) 
European Journal of International Law, pp. 725–48. 
35 Goodman and Jinks  “How to Influence States,” p. 630. 
36 Ibid., p. 702. 
37 Harold Hongju Koh “Internalization through Socialization” v. 54 n. 4 (2005) Duke Law Journal, 
pp. 975–82. 
38 Ibid., p. 975. 
39 Jose Alvarez “Do States Socialize?” v. 54 n. 4 (2005) Duke Law Journal, pp. 961–74. 
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best route to getting state actors to be more fully and genuinely engaged with 
human rights regimes lies through an implicit affront to their sovereign pride 
and autonomy; that is, through mechanisms for compliance based on the 
premise that states act or should act like unthinking teenagers socially opting 
for the latest fad.40 
I share his misgivings. 
In 2008 Eran Shor identified three serious problems with the “spiral 
model” of socialization.41 Focusing on Israel, he first challenged the model’s 
over-deterministic and idealistic arguments. The authors suggest that once 
states adopt the rhetoric of human rights and begin to move toward norm 
compliance, there is no turning back. I will demonstrate the weakness of this 
unidirectional argument and show its failure to predict the developments in a 
number of countries, including Israel.42 
Second, the spiral model “treats a country’s repressive practices as a 
homogeneous conglomerate” that prevents the model from accounting for 
differentiation in the practices and policies of a given country. Lastly, the model 
“fails to account for the role of serious conflicts and security threats in shaping 
state’s repressive policies. Such threats severely impede the power of human 
rights norms to bring a change.”43 
Shor concluded with a criticism of direct relevance to this chapter: 
The third major weakness of the spiral model lies in its overarching claims. The 
model does not specify the scope of its generalization and fails to indicate 
countries and conditions to which it may not apply. One set of such countries are 
political and economic superpowers such as Russia and China, or states that 
enjoy geopolitical importance, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Pressures 
from human rights networks in these countries have only minor effects on state 
policies. While Israel may be another example of a state with geopolitical 
centrality, it is also an example of a second set of countries for which the model 
fails to work in full: states that suffer from intense political conflicts, most 
notably wars and large insurgency campaigns. Under such conditions states find 
it much easier to justify (to themselves and to the international community) the 
violation of human rights, and thus the power of human rights norms 
significantly weakens. While the global human rights regime has meaningful 
consequences, it is seriously undermined when confronted by severe conflicts 
and security threats. Russia, for example, has justified severe human rights 
violations since the late 1990s with the need to fight Chechnyan terrorism. 
Similarly, Turkish repression of Kurdish rights exacerbated significantly during 
the late 1980s and the early 1990s, following the formation of the PKK (i.e., the 
Kurdistan Workers Party) and its subsequent terror attacks. Other salient 
                                                          
40 Ibid., p. 974. 
41 Eran Shor “Conflict, Terrorism, and the Socialization of Human Rights Norms: The Spiral Model 
Revisited” v. 55 n. 1 (2008) Social Problems, pp. 117 – 38. 
42 Ibid., p. 118. 
43 Ibid., p. 118. 
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examples include the bloody fight of Sri Lanka’s government against the Tamil 
separatist movement and the repressive response of the Algerian government to 
fundamental Islamic terrorism since 1992. In all of these cases, the ability of 
human rights networks to achieve major changes through normative pressures 
is highly limited by the presence of intense domestic conflicts.44 
In 2010 Brian Greenhill introduced the idea of a “socialization effect”45: 
An alternative and perhaps more subtle way in which IGOs (Inter-Governmental 
Organisations) might influence states’ human rights performance is through a 
socialization effect. Unlike the mechanism described above, socialization effects 
refer to behavioral changes that presumably come about through changes in the 
actors’ interests. … Socialization effects are of particular interest to 
constructivist theories of IR because they specify a mechanism through which 
states’ interests can change as a result of interaction with others. … This makes 
intuitive sense; IGOs provide venues in which policymakers from different 
countries regularly come together to discuss common problems.46 
In his conclusion, Greenhill mentioned Russia: 
This may lead to situations where, for example, human rights activists ought to 
be more concerned with encouraging a state like Russia to continue to work 
closely with an IGO like the Nordic Council of Ministers (which has a very high 
average PIR Score47) than to join up with IGOs whose mandate might appear to 
be more directly relevant to human rights issues, but whose member states have 
far poorer human rights records.48 
In Greenwood’s case, application of the “spiral model” of socialization has led 
him, in my view, to a rather eccentric conclusion. 
There has to my knowledge been one book-length attempt to apply the 
“spiral model” of socialization to Russia: Sinikukka Saari’s 2010 Promoting 
Democracy and Human Rights in Russia.49 In this text, a revised version of her 
PhD thesis defended at the London School of Economics, she too subscribed to 
“the constructivist understanding, which asserts that states seek to act according 
to their identities. Identities are definitions of self in relation to others, and they 
are constructed – and reconstructed – in intersubjective processes between 
                                                          
44 Ibid., pp. 131–32. 
45 Brian Greenhill “The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of 
Human Rights Norms” v. 54 n. 1 (2010) International Studies Quarterly, pp. 127–45. 
46 Ibid., p. 129. 
47 Personal Integrity Rights (PIR), “[T]he PIR score reflects the actual behavior of each state with 
respect to certain types of human rights violations, and takes no account of whether each state 
may or may not have passed legislation in an effort to protect these rights. The PIR index should 
therefore be thought of as an indicator of a country’s compliance with human rights norms, 
rather than merely a reflection of its expressed commitment to upholding these norms,” p. 133. 
48 Greenhill “The Company You Keep,” p. 143. 




states and international structures.”50 She applied this methodology to three 
specific European human rights norms: “… the open-ended process through 
which norms are actively promoted, resisted and reinterpreted and renegotiated 
in practice between Russia and the European intergovernmental 
organizations.”51 She meant the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), the CoE, and the European Union (EU). 
She selected three case studies on specific norms “related to the ideals of 
functioning democracy and respect for human rights”: the establishment and 
functioning of a human rights ombudsman institution; the abolition of the death 
penalty; and the organization of free and fair federal-level elections in Russia.52 
Her introduction to the CoE was brief and cursory,53 and she had almost nothing 
to say about Russia’s experience of the Strasbourg Court or even the role of 
Russian advocates and domestic NGOs in bringing many hundreds of cases. She 
was apparently not aware of the considerable literature on these topics.54 
At note 39 she set out an overview of case statistics to 2005 only. Her 
conclusion as to the death penalty was as follows: 
What we have here is neither a great failure nor a success case of 
socialization … it seems that Russia has been socialised to the practice of 
cooperation with the European organisations, but it clearly has not been 
socialized to the norms and values of the organizations. … Russia is willing to 
cooperate with the organisations. However, it is only willing to do so on its own 
terms.55 
She concludes: 
As this book has argued, Russia’s creeping challenge has proved to be much 
harder to deal with as it has developed gradually under the surface of “sustained 
efforts” to implement the norm. The organizations have placed too much 
                                                          
50 Ibid., p. 5. 
51 Ibid., p. 6. 
52 Ibid., p. 10. 
53 Ibid., pp. 22–26. 
54 Including my own, for example, Bill Bowring “The Death Penalty and Russia” in Jon Yorke (ed.) 
The Right to Life and the Value of Life: Orientations in Law, Politics and Ethics (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 269–88. 
55 Saari Promoting Democracy and Human Rights in Russia, p. 77. 
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emphasis on the declared rhetorical goals of the Russian leadership. Even in 
cases where legislation has been passed and official rhetoric seems to be 
consistent, the change in practice will not necessarily follow – particularly in a 
country like Russia with a strong tradition of Soviet double-speak.56 
Serious though Saari’s work was in conception and execution, the end result 
exemplifies to my mind the failure of the social constructivist international 
relations theory to illuminate the complex relationship of Russia to international 
law, instruments, and mechanisms, in particular its almost twenty years’ 
engagement with the CoE and the ECHR. The problem may well lie in the attempt 
to explain Russia as a difficult teenager. 
More recent scholarly work has tended to highlight the positive side of 
Russia’s relationship with the CoE. 
In 2012 the Canadian political scientist Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom focused 
on the work of Russian NGOs in the implementation of judgments against Russia, 
mobilizing thorough and wide-ranging empirical research.57 She concluded: 
The analysis in this paper thus leads us to a number of preliminary conclusions. 
NGOs can and do have a significant impact on the progress of implementation of 
ECHR principles in Russia when the key domestic actors involved have 
incentives to comply. This can be the case at lower levels of the bureaucracy as a 
result of professional norms or fear of reprimand for causing further cases 
against the government. At higher political levels, implementation may be more 
successful because measures demanded in ECtHR rulings are compatible with 
other high-level policy agendas, such as modernization and purification of the 
legal system from corruption.58 
She returned to these issues in 201459 and concluded: 
It is clear that ECtHR litigation is a significant new area of human rights activism 
in Russia, and it is unique in that the vast majority of Russian citizens are now 
aware of this mechanism and read about it in the domestic news, while many 
other forms of human rights activism remain largely unknown among the 
public. The ECtHR does remain as one of the few binding international 
mechanisms to pressure the Russian government to improve its human rights 
practices, and in this sense, as long as Russia maintains its membership in the 
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Council of Europe, its potential is enormous and the trajectory of its impact has 
only just begun.60 
In 2015 Lindsay Parrott looked in detail at the pilot judgment procedure in 
relation to Russia, employing, as I noted earlier, the constructivist “spiral model” 
of socialization.61 As she summarized her argument: 
This paper argues that although many are unconvinced of the CoE’s 
ability to precipitate change within the Russian penal system, due to a lack of 
financial incentives and Russian skepticism of the West, the creation of an 
intensified discussion of shortcomings within the pre-trial detention system as a 
result of the current measures taken by the ECHR and the CoE should be seen as 
a success.62 
She concluded: 
Deciding how best to approach systemic issues in member states has 
not been easy, as there are a limited number of mechanisms available to the CoE 
and ECHR, and each state has its own political agenda to keep in mind. To 
undertake systemic changes to Russia’s penal system to curb pre-trial violations, 
the ECHR and the CoE determined that the pilot judgment procedure would 
produce more worthwhile and durable results, since Russia had already started 
making legislative changes by its own initiative. The pilot judgment procedure 
allowed the Russian government to remain in control of the decision-making 
process, as it developed its own action plan and time frame in which to make 
changes. Russia acted as an equal partner, but the ECHR and the CoE have been 
able to use financial penalties as a means to keep the pressure on in ensuring 
that Russia meets it obligations.63 
The interventions by these two scholars do not at all mirror the apocalyptic 
remarks made by the commentators to whom I referred in the first section of this 
chapter. However, recent developments may turn out to show that those 
comments were in fact rather prophetic. 
And in my own recent historical-legal work,64 I have shown that from at 
least the eighteenth century onward, Russian law has developed in close 
connection with European law. Indeed this was the case with the first professor 
of law to teach in Russian in 1768 at the recently established Moscow University, 
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Semyon Yefimovich Desnitsky (1740–89), who was awarded his Doctorate in 
Civil Law by Glasgow University after six years of study from 1761 to 1767, 
including attending the lectures on constitutional law by Adam Smith. He 
proposed to Catherine II abolition of serfdom and a constitutional monarchy. The 
first of these was achieved in 1861 (failure to achieve the second was one of the 
causes of revolution in Russia), and in 1864, as part of Aleksandr II’s great legal 
reforms,65 trial by jury was introduced to the Russian Empire. Although all 
existing models were studied, Russian reforms followed the English model.66 The 
titles of the Justices of the Peace also created in 1864, and now restored, were a 
direct translation of the English. Starting in 1993, trial by jury has been restored 
for serious crimes in all parts of the Russian Federation, the last being Chechnya. 
The same reforms created the Bar, whose highest category were the prisyazhniy 
poverenniy, advocates who were permitted to defend in jury trials.67 The most 
famous jury trial was that of the revolutionary Vera Zasulich in 1878. She was 
acquitted.68 
The independent bar, the advokatura, which retained its independence 
even in the Soviet period, is now in my view the shining light sometimes 
illuminating the grim wasteland of contemporary Russian legality. 
As I show in my Conclusion, the fierce debates that characterized three 
centuries of Russian legal thinking and practice have continued into the present 
day. 
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6.4 Russia’s Engagement with the Strasbourg Court 
The background to Russia’s twenty-year engagement with the ECHR system is 
that post-Soviet Russia has a “monist” approach to international law, and Article 
15(4) of the 1993 RF Constitution provides that treaties take priority over 
domestic law.69 
4. The universally-recognized norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of 
its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian 
Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the 
international agreement shall be applied. 
Article 46(3) contains the necessary corollary: 
3. Everyone shall have the right to appeal, according to international treaties of 
the Russian Federation, to international bodies for the protection of human 
rights and freedoms, if all the existing internal state means of legal protection 
have been exhausted. 
On ratification in 1996, the ECHR became an integral part of Russian law, a fact 
that has been many times repeated by the Russian CC (and by Mr. Zorkin 
himself), most recently in its judgment of 19 January 2017, when it stated: 
By virtue of Article 15 (section 4) of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, the [ECHR] as an international treaty of the Russian Federation is an 
integral part of its legal system, which obliges the State to execute judgments of 
the [ECtHR] based on the Convention and delivered on complaints against 
Russia, in respect of persons participating in the case. The [RUSSIAN CC] in its 
practice adheres to the approach aimed at undeviating execution of judgments 
of the [ECtHR], even if their content is based on application of methods of 
“evolutive interpretation,” “priority of the substance over form” and others, 
which can entail deviation from the positions elaborated by it earlier. 
On 10 October 2003 the RF Supreme Court adopted a Resolution “On application 
by courts of general jurisdiction of the commonly recognized principles and 
norms of the international law and the international treaties of the Russian 
Federation.”70 This Resolution, drafted with the participation of the justices of 
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the Russian CC and Anatoliy Kovler, then Russia’s judge at the ECtHR, is binding 
on all lower courts and contained the following with reference to the ECHR: 
10. It is clarified to the courts that international treaties should be 
interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
23 May, 1969 (section 3; articles 31–33). 
In accordance with item “b” of paragraph 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention, any subsequent practice in the application of a treaty, which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation, should be 
taken into account along with its context for the purposes of interpretation of 
the treaty. 
As a member state of the [ECHR], the Russian Federation recognizes the 
jurisdiction of the [ECtHR] as compulsory in issues of interpretation and 
application of the Convention and its Protocols in the event of presumed breach 
of provisions of said treaty acts by the Russian Federation, if such a breach took 
place after their entry into force in respect of the Russian Federation (Article 1 
of Federal Law “On Ratification of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols,” No. 54-FZ of 30th March 
1998). This is why the said Convention should be applied by courts with regard 
to the practice of the [ECtHR] in order to avoid any violation of the Convention. 
11. The [ECHR] has its own mechanism, which includes compulsory 
jurisdiction of the [ECtHR] and a systematic supervision of execution of the 
Court’s judgments by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
Pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 46 of the Convention, final judgments 
concerning the Russian Federation are binding for all state bodies of the Russian 
Federation, including the courts. 
The execution of judgments concerning the Russian Federation implies, 
if necessary, the obligation of the state to take individual measures, aimed at 
erasing the violations of human rights, stipulated by the Convention, and the 
consequences of those violations for the applicant, as well as general measures, 
aimed at preventing further similar violations. Within their scope of 
competence, the courts must act so as to ensure the fulfillment of obligations of 
the state, arising from the participation of the Russian Federation in the [ECHR] 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
If, during the consideration of a case, circumstances are discovered that 
contributed to the violation of citizens’ rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the 
Convention, the court may issue a special ruling (or judgment), drawing the 
attention of corresponding organizations and officials to the circumstances and 
facts of the violation of said rights and freedoms, that require necessary 
measures to be taken. 
Early on, as could have been expected, Russia (like other members of the CoE, for 
example, the United Kingdom) began to lose a number of high-profile cases in 
the Strasbourg Court. In May 2004, in Gusinskiy v. Russia71 the Court held that 
Russia had acted in bad faith in using the criminal justice system to force a 
commercial deal, by arresting the TV magnate. In July 2004, in Ilaşcu and Others 
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v. Moldova and Russia72 the majority of the Grand Chamber of the Court found in 
a controversial ruling that Russia had rendered support to Transdniestria, which 
broke away from Moldova, amounting to “effective control.”73 The first six 
Chechen applicants against Russia won their applications to Strasbourg in 
February 2005.74 In April 2005 in Shamayev and 12 others v. Russia and 
Georgia,75 the Court condemned Russia for deliberately refusing to cooperate 
with the Court despite diplomatic assurances. 
On 15 January 2009 the ECtHR applied the pilot judgment procedure in 
the case of Burdov v. Russia (no. 2).76 This case addressed Russia’s ongoing 
failure to honor judgments in respect of which no effective domestic remedies 
were available to the parties concerned. In its judgment, the ECtHR explicitly 
ordered that Russia set up such a remedy within six months from the date on 
which the judgment became final (by 4 November 2009) and grant “adequate 
and sufficient redress” by 4 May 2010 to all persons in the applicant’s position in 
the cases lodged with the Court before the delivery of the pilot judgment 
(paragraphs 141, 145). 
Leach, Hardman, and Stephenson77 concluded: 
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Arguably, the Russian Federation’s response to Burdov (No. 2) is another 
important indicator of the effectiveness of the ECtHR, when faced with a deluge 
of cases, many of which highlight systemic or endemic structural problems. Its 
timely implementation of the judgment will be keenly anticipated.78 
There is also a case study of a good result. On 27 March 2008 the ECtHR gave 
judgment in Shtukaturov v. Russia.79 The judgment, which became final in June 
2008, concerned issues of judicial deprivation of legal capacity in the absence of 
the person concerned and involuntary admission to a psychiatric hospital. The 
Court indicated that the standards existing in Russia in regard to this particular 
matter differed from those adopted at the European level. Although there were 
no general measures indicated by the Court in its judgment, at the end of 2008 
the Committee of Ministers noted that the relevant provisions of Russian law on 
the incapacity of adults had not been modified.80 On 27 February 2009 the 
Russian CC considered an application lodged by Mr. Shtukaturov and others to 
challenge the compliance of the relevant provisions of Russian law with the RF 
Constitution and agreed with the applicant.81 The provisions were declared to be 
incompatible with the RF Constitution and discontinued with immediate effect. 
Relevant amendments to the legislation were initiated by the Russian 
Parliament. These were finalized and entered into force in 2011.82 
There has been domestic legislation designed to improve compliance with 
judgments of the Strasbourg Court. 
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In May 2011, a Russian presidential decree, “On the monitoring of the 
application of law in the Russian Federation,” was adopted.83 It provides that one 
of the goals of such monitoring is to ensure the enforcement of those judgments 
of the ECtHR that require legislative change.84 
The Russian Law on Compensation went into effect on 4 May 2010.85 This 
law enables claims for compensation based on a violation of the right to a fair 
trial, and to enforcement, within a reasonable time. The compensation awarded 
is not dependent on the establishment of fault of any competent authorities 
responsible for delayed enforcement. 
On 7 October 2010 the Chamber of the ECtHR gave judgment in the case 
of Konstantin Markin v. Russia, a controversial case concerning violations of 
Article 14 (discrimination) with Article 8 (respect for family and private life), 
denying a serving male officer leave to look after his children, which would have 
been available to a female officer.86 The Chamber strongly criticized the ruling of 
15 January 2009 of the Russian CC.87 
In their 2011 article, Issaeva, Sergeeva, and Suchkova concluded: 
In our view, if used wisely, the Convention mechanisms will enable Russia to do 
the “impossible”: to bring its legal system to the level of international standards, 
a feat which it has not yet been able to accomplish. However, this aim will 
always need to be balanced against the anxiety shown by the Russian 
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authorities regarding the possible misuse of these powerful instruments to exert 
excessive political pressure.88 
The Markin case was referred at Russia’s request to the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR, and on 22 March 2012 the Chamber’s judgment was upheld, but this time 
with no overt criticism of the Russian CC.89 
On 10 January 2012 the ECtHR delivered a “pilot judgment” against 
Russia in the case of Ananyev and Others v. Russia,90 requiring Russia to submit 
an action plan within six months. The judgment in Ananyev became final on 10 
April 2012. On 10 October 2012 the Russian Federation submitted its action plan 
to the Committee of Ministers.91 Russia’s implementation of its action plan has 
been subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, and, to date, there has 
been no adverse comment. On 13 February 2013 the Russian Federation 
provided to the Committee of Ministers a further action plan and report, focusing 
on the conditions of detention of Mr. Ananyev.92 
Armed with the Grand Chamber judgment of 22 March 2012, Mr. Markin 
returned to the Russian courts, and on 30 January 2013 the Leningrad Okrug 
Military Court applied to the Russian CC to decide the issue arising from the fact 
that in Russian law the judgments of the Russian CC and the ECtHR appeared to 
be of equal status. The Russian CC gave judgment on 6 December 2013;93 Judge 
Sergei Mavrin, a participant in the debates, was Judge Rapporteur.94 The Russian 
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CC held that if provisions of Russian law impeached by the ECtHR are found to be 
consistent with the RF Constitution, then the issue must be referred to the 
Russian CC, which will determine possible constitutional means of 
implementation of the judgment of the ECtHR. Outright refusal to obey the 
judgment of the ECtHR was ruled out. Professor Ekaterina Mishina observed: 
Good for you, dear judges. You masterfully avoided an open confrontation with 
the ECtHR and at the same time made it clear who the boss is and who will 
decide whether to implement decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
on Russian territory.95 
In my book chapter discussing this case,96 I concluded97: 
Russia has not (yet) defied the Strasbourg Court. And the Russian CC has 
decided to pursue a path of pragmatism, while at the same time reserving the 
right to exercise its unique power to interpret and enforce the Russian 
Constitution. In my view the omens to that extent are good for Russia’s 
continued membership of the Council of Europe, and engagement with the 
Strasbourg Court. 
On 27 June 2013 the RF Supreme Court passed a ruling “On application of the 
ECHR by the courts of general jurisdiction.”98 This affirmed the principles 
contained in the 2003 Resolution and directed that the judgments of the ECtHR 
in cases against Russia are mandatory for Russian courts and judgments against 
other countries must be taken into account: 
2. As follows from Article 46 of the Convention, Article 1 of [the Federal Law on 
Ratification], the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights 
contained in the final judgments of the Court delivered in respect of the Russian 
Federation are obligatory for the courts. 
In order to effectively protect human rights the courts take into consideration 
the legal positions of the European Court expressed in its final judgments taken 
in respect of other States which are parties to the Convention. However this 
legal position is to be taken into consideration by the court if the circumstances 
of the case under examination are similar to those which have been the subject 
of analysis and findings made by the European Court. 
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The resolution noted that any restriction of rights and freedoms (including 
detention) should be based on federal law, pursue a legitimate goal, and be 
necessary in a democratic society, that is, be proportional. It focused on Article 
5(4) ECHR, providing the right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of 
detention and immediate release if the detention is not lawful and reasonable.99 
However, there has been a recent souring of relations, as Leach and 
Donald pointed out,100 as a direct result of the Yukos case and the unprecedented 
award of just satisfaction: 
There is little doubt that certain ECtHR judgments have proved to be 
decidedly unpalatable to the Kremlin. As commentators such as Halya Coynash 
have observed,101 the 2014 judgment in the Yukos case,102 as a result of which 
€1.8 billion has to be paid to Yukos shareholders,103 was particularly unpopular 
for the authorities in Moscow. However, there is no shortage of decisions which 
seem to be considered repugnant, such as the Court’s attribution of Russian 
responsibility for human rights violations committed in Transdniestria (the 
separatist region of Moldova) in Ilaşcu and Catan.104 Other commentators have 
placed in the same bracket the grand chamber judgment which the Court passed 
down on the same day (4 December) that the bill passed its third reading, 
Roman Zakharov v Russia, concerning the very broad powers of the FSB (the 
Russian secret service) to monitor telephones.105 As the Court found a 
significant series of shortcomings in the legal framework regulating the 
interception of communications, its implementation will require substantial 
changes to the law. 
I disagree with Leach and Donald, however, and with the comments made on 16 
July 2016 by Anne Brasseur, the then President of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the CoE (PACE),106, as to the interpretation of the Postanovleniye (resolution) of 
the Russian CC of 14 July 2015, No. 21-P.107 This judgment resulted from a 
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request by a group of ninety-three deputies of the State Duma as to whether a 
number of legislative enactments were compatible with the RF Constitution. 
These were Article 1 of the 1998 Law on Ratification of the ECHR; Article 32(1) 
and (2) of the Federal law, “On international treaties of the Russian Federation”; 
and provisions of the Civil Procedural Code, Arbitrazh (Commercial) Procedural 
Code, Code of Administrative Misdemeanors, and the Criminal Procedural Code. 
In the view of the deputies, these enactments were incompatible with Articles 
15(1)(2) and (4) and Article 79 of the RF Constitution, since they in fact obliged 
Russian organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power to unconditionally 
implement judgments of the ECtHR, even in cases where such judgments 
contradicted the RF Constitution. 
The Court ruled that these provisions were compatible with the RF 
Constitution, but laid the basis for the amending law discussed in the first section 
of this chapter. The judgment, for which the Judge Rapporteur was the Court’s 
Deputy Chairman, Sergey Mavrin confirmed the subsidiary nature of the 
Strasbourg system and the obligatory nature of Strasbourg judgments and paid 
close attention not only to the provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties but also to the case law of the German Constitutional Court (the 
Görgülü and Solange-1 judgments), the Italian Constitutional Court in its 
judgment of 31 May 2011 in the Maggio v. Italy case and its 22 October 2014 
judgment following the ICJ’s Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (2012) case; 
the Austrian Constitutional Court’s judgment of 14 October 1987; and of course 
the UK Supreme Court’s judgment of 16 October 2013 following Hirst v. UK. State 
organs could apply to the Russian CC in a concrete case to ask whether a 
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judgment of the ECtHR was “impossible” to implement because it contradicted 
the foundations of the Russian constitutional order. The Court gave as an 
example the judgment in Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia of 14 July 2013,108 the 
Russian Hirst, on prisoners’ voting rights. In the Court’s view, to implement the 
judgment would mean violating a series of articles of the RF Constitution 
(Articles 15[1], 32[3], and 79), or adopting a new Constitution. 
Anna Pushkarskaya, writing on the day of the judgment in Kommersant, 
pointed out that the background to the application was the Yukos just 
satisfaction decision and expected that there would be a further application to 
the Court in respect of that decision.109 However, the following day she published 
an interview with Judge Sergey Mavrin in which he stated that the Russian CC 
would always seek a compromise with Strasbourg and avoid a direct collision. 
The effect of an application to the Russian CC in a concrete case would be to 
provide a breathing space.110 
Also on the positive side, on 11 January 2016 the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the CoE, assisted by the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, had 
published a report on the impact of the ECHR in various countries111. The report 
identified a number of instances of positive impact in Russia: 
 As a result of a pilot judgment (Burdov v. Russia) in 2009 over 
non-enforcement of a domestic court judgment in favor of the 
applicant, Russia enacted a Federal Compensation Act, as well as a 
Federal Law to guarantee the effectiveness of the new remedy. 
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 In 2005 the RF Supreme Court followed up the 2004 Declaration of 
the Committee of Ministers and extended journalists’ freedom of 
expression to criticism of public officials: public officials must 
accept that they will be subject to public scrutiny and criticism. In 
2008 the Court closed a number of applications in view of this 
change. 
 Following Mikheyev v. Russia (2006) and other similar judgments, 
on account of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment 
inflicted on persons held in police custody and a lack of effective 
investigations into such acts, special investigation units were 
created within the Investigative Committee and tasked with 
investigating particularly complex crimes by police and other law 
enforcement bodies. 
 There had been progress in the implementation of the Court’s 
2012 pilot judgment in Ananyev and Others v. Russia concerning 
inhuman and degrading conditions in Russian remand centers and 
the lack of an effective remedy. Russia presented and has been 
implementing an action plan as a result, monitored by the 
Committee of Ministers. 
 A number of measures had been taken to remedy numerous 
violations of the right to liberty, guaranteed by Article 5 of the 
Convention, owing to unlawful and lengthy unreasoned (or poorly 
reasoned) detention on remand. Legislative changes were made 
between 2008 and 2011. Both the Russian CC and the RF Supreme 
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Court had emphasized that a suspect or accused may be detained 
only on the basis of a valid judicial decision. This was most 
recently monitored by the Committee of Ministers in 2015. 
This section of my chapter has, I believe, demonstrated a significantly in-depth 
and serious engagement between Russia and the CoE, lasting for two decades. 
6.5 Russia’s Final Break with the European Convention on Human Rights? 
Developments since the start of 2016 have thrown the optimistic prognosis of 
the scholars to whom I have referred, and my own evaluation, into doubt. 
On 11 March 2016 the CoE’s constitutional law experts, the Venice 
Commission, adopted an interim opinion determining that the new law, referred 
to at the start of this chapter, was incompatible with Russia’s international legal 
obligations and must be amended. The Venice Commission stated that it is a duty 
of all state bodies to reconcile provisions of the international treaties in force in 
Russia with the RF Constitution, for instance, through interpretation or even 
modifying the Constitution. “The Russian Federation should have recourse to 
dialogue, instead of resorting to unilateral measures.”112 This was published on 
15 March 2016.113 
                                                          
112 Press release at 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2425095&Site=DC&BackColorInternet=F5CA75&BackColo
rIntranet=F5CA75&BackColorLogged=A9BACE (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
113 CDL-AD(2016)005-e: Interim Opinion on the amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law 
on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation adopted by the Venice Commission at its 
106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11–12 March 2016), at 




On 13 June 2016 the Venice Commission published its Final Opinion.114 
The Final Opinion was made necessary by the fact that the Russian authorities 
had been unable to host the Commission’s working group to discuss the 
amendments prior to the March session, so that the opinion was adopted as an 
interim one, and it was agreed that a final opinion would be prepared for the 
June session.115 
Also, as the Commission noted,116 on 19 April 2016 the Russian CC had 
rendered a judgment117 in which it examined the question of the possibility of 
executing the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 4 July 2013 in 
the case of Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia in accordance with the RF 
Constitution.118 
There were amicus curiae briefs before the Russian CC arguing that the 
problem could be resolved by interpreting the RF Constitution, rather than 
seeking to amend it, which the Russian CC cannot do. The Russian CC, with three 
powerful dissents, disagreed and held that in 1998, when Russia ratified the 
ECHR, there was no case law under Article 3 of Protocol 1 (right to democratic 
elections) prohibiting a “blanket ban” on prisoners’ voting. Otherwise, 
ratification would have contradicted the RF Constitution. However, the Russian 
                                                          
114 Opinion No. 832/2015, CDL-AD(2016)016, Final Opinion on the amendments to the Federal 
Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, adopted by the Venice 
Commission at its 107th Plenary Session (Venice, 10–11 June 2016), at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)016-e 
(accessed on 29 January 2017). 
115 Ibid., para. 4. 
116 Ibid., para. 5. 
117 No. 12- П/2016, 19 April 2016. 
118 For an early analysis, see Marina Aksenova “Anchugov and Gladkov Is Not Enforceable: The 




d+%28Opinio+Juris%29 (accessed on 29 January 2017) – this article has very useful links. 
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CC suggested that by an amendment to the criminal law persons detained in 
Russian “open prison” correctional colonies could be reclassified so that they do 
not fall within Article 32(2) of the RF Constitution. If this was done, Russia would 
in effect implement the ECHR’s judgment. The Russian CC emphasized the 
priority of international law, especially the ECHR, over Russian domestic law, 
while insisting that it is the final judge in issues concerning the RF Constitution. 
I agreed at the time with the CoE Secretary-General, Thorbjørn Jagland, 
that the “judgment of the Constitutional Court suggests that there is a way to 
resolve the issue through a change of legislation which would alleviate the 
existing restrictions on the right to vote.”119 
In this way Russia could have avoided repeating the collision between the 
CoE and the United Kingdom over prisoners’ voting rights after the 2005 
judgment in Hirst v. United Kingdom,120 which the United Kingdom has simply 
refused, for political reasons, to implement, or that of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
after the 2009 judgment in Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina121 
(discrimination against Jews and Roma in presidential elections), 
implementation of which would mean undoing the Dayton Agreements. 
The Venice Commission in its 13 June 2016 Final Opinion stressed (para. 
38), “at the outset that the execution of the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights is an unequivocal, imperative legal obligation, whose respect is 
vital for preserving and fostering the community of principles and values of the 
European continent.” 
                                                          
119 http://www.coe.int/en/web/secretary-general/-/secretary-general-comments-on-russian-
constitutional-court-judgment-today (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
120 Application No. 74025/01, Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 6 October 2005. 




It welcomed (para. 33) the fact that the Russian CC had not spared its 
efforts to avoid a conflict with Strasbourg, but (para. 27) considered that 
the question of the execution of an international decision should not be 
delegated in its entirety to the Constitutional Court; the Commission therefore 
recommends that the wording of the revised Federal Law on the Constitutional 
Court be amended to provide that the Government Agent (or other State 
authority) may seek a decision of the Constitutional Court on the compatibility 
with the Russian constitution of a specific modality of execution which it intends 
to take, when it has doubts that such a modality may raise issues of 
constitutionality. 
On 6 December 2016 it was reported that the IX Congress of Judges of the 
Russian Federation had been addressed by Guido Raimondi, the president of the 
ECtHR.122 According to the report, he was careful to sidestep difficult issues, and 
praised the Russian authorities for the fact that they were implementing the 
decisions of the ECtHR. He approvingly observed that Russia was no longer the 
main source of complaints to the Strasbourg Court. He particularly noted the 
efforts that Russia made to implement the decisions of the ECtHR by way of 
carrying out reforms and through the practice of the Supreme and Constitutional 
courts. In the work of the former, the President of the ECtHR singled out the 
practice of reversing sentences in connection with violations of Article 6 of the 
ECHR on the right to a fair trial. And in the work of the Russian CC, he was 
attracted by the way in which it interwove the practice of the ECtHR in its 
decisions. 
As to the problems in relations between Russia and the ECtHR, he 
preferred to pass them by, preferring to “look at the picture as a whole.” He did 
not mention, for example, that on 15 December the Russian CC was to consider 
the question of the possibility of implementing the judgment of the ECtHR as to 
paying €1.8 billion to the former shareholders of Yukos. In fact, the question of 
                                                          
122https://zakon.ru/discussion/2016/12/06/predsedatel_espch_pohvalil_rossiyu_za_ispolnenie_
reshenij_suda__otkrytie_devyatogo_sezda_sudej_prosh (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
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noncompliance with this judgment was soon to be considered by the Committee 
of Ministers123. Also, he did not call to mind that on 16 November 2016 the RF 
Supreme Court had overturned the sentence in the Kirovles case concerning the 
opposition leader and fighter against corruption, Aleksei Navalny.124 Mr. Navalny 
did not agree with the RF Supreme Court’s decision that there must be a retrial, 
considering that the ECtHR had ruled that there was no criminal element in his 
activities125. 
6.6 The Yukos Case – Has Russia Finally Decided against Strasbourg? 
The long-awaited judgment in the Yukos case was delivered on 19 January 
2017.126 Once again, the Court was furnished with, and accepted for 
consideration, expert amicus curiae briefs. On 30 November 2016 Kanstantin 
Dzehtsiarou of Liverpool University and Maxim Timofeyev of the European 
Humanitarian University in Vilnius submitted their eighteen-page amicus 
brief,127 and on 7 December 2016 the Institute for Law and Public Policy 
provided a closely argued thirty-three-page brief, drafted by Grigoriy Vaipan, 
                                                          
123 http://kommersant.ru/doc/3162703 (accessed on 30 January 2017). 
124https://zakon.ru/discussion/2016/11/16/prezidium_vs_otpravil_delo_kirovlesa_na_novoe_ra
ssmotrenie__posle_resheniya_espch_o_narushenii_prav_ (accessed on 30 January 2017). 
125 Navalny and Ofitserov v. Russia, Application Nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, Judgment of 23 
February 2016. The Russian courts had found the applicants guilty of acts indistinguishable from 
regular commercial activities. In other words, the criminal law had been arbitrarily construed to 
the applicants’ detriment. The courts had failed to address Mr. Navalny’s arguable allegation that 
the reasons for his prosecution were his political activities. 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-161060 (accessed on 30 January 2017). 
126 See https://rg.ru/2017/01/19/reg-szfo/konstitucionnyj-sud-rf-vynes-reshenie-po-delu-
iukosa.html (accessed on 29 January 2017). Text of the judgment with the two dissenting 
judgments at http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision258613.pdf (accessed on 29 January 
2017). 
127 This is to be found on the website of the Russian CC at 
http://www.ksrf.ru/ru/Sessions/Documents/Yukos_Zaklyucheniye_30_11_2016.pdf (accessed 
on 29 January 2017). 
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arguing against a finding of “impossibility,” both warning of damage to the 
reputation and authority of the Russian CC.128 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Yaroslavtsev argued that the Russian CC’s 
judgment contradicted the principle of legality and by taking on the function of a 
legislator exceeded its competence.129 Judge Aranovskiy concluded: “But taking 
the judgment as a whole, the court does not find a correct basis for its decision, 
and, shifting its coordinates, loses itself in a general series of political, 
administrative and financial considerations, which are not equal to legal 
reasoning.” 
On 21 January 2017 the co-rapporteurs of the Monitoring Committee for 
the Russian Federation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE), Theodora Bakoyannis and Liliane Maury Pasquier (Switzerland, SOC), 
and the rapporteur of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights for the 
implementation of judgments of the ECtHR, Pierre-Yves Le Borgn’ expressed 
their deep concern at the Russian CC judgment.130 They reiterated that the full 
implementation of the judgments of the ECtHR is a legal commitment to which 
the Russian Federation has subscribed under the ECHR. They added: 
Unconditionally honouring the Convention is an obligation incumbent on all 
member States and it is therefore unacceptable that Russia would not enforce a 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The Russian authorities 
should therefore consider implementing the recommendation of the Venice 
Commission of the Council of Europe that the authorities consider revising the 
constitutional provisions at odds with the implementation of the ECtHR 
judgment. One cannot accept a selective implementation of the ECtHR’s 
judgments. 
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http://ilpp.ru/netcat_files/userfiles/Litigation_Treinings/Amicus/8_YUKOS_Amicus%20Curiae
%20Brief_07-12-2016.pdf (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
129 And see Anna Pushkarskaya, 24 January 2017, Kommersant, at 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3200196 (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
130 http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/News/News-View-
EN.asp?newsid=6484&lang=2&cat=9 (accessed on 30 January 2017). 
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As Maxim Timofeyev, the coauthor of one of the amicus briefs, commented on 26 
January 2017,131 this was the first time the apex court of a CoE member state 
concluded that it should not pay just satisfaction. He summarized three main 
reasons given by the Russian CC for its decision. 
Firstly, the Russian CC noted that both the prosecution of the company for 
tax evasion and subsequent enforcement proceedings were based on legal 
provisions that it earlier had found in compliance with the RF Constitution. 
Secondly, the Russian CC relied on the historical context of the 1990s, the 
“economic uncertainty,” and the fact that the Russian state was seeking to take 
special measures to defeat the tax avoidance strategies of Yukos and to pay for 
social welfare. If the government had decided to apply the statutory time-bar in 
the Yukos case, it would have acted in contradiction with the RF Constitution, 
which requires the state to ensure the payment of taxes by every person as 
required by the principles of equality and fairness. Thirdly, the Russian CC 
emphasized that Yukos was acting in bad faith by using tax avoidance schemes. 
Yukos should have foreseen the government’s actions. Thus, payment of just 
compensation from the Russian budget to the shareholders of a company that 
was involved in vast tax avoiding activities would be contrary to the 
constitutional principles of equality and fairness. 
On this reasoning, execution of the ECtHR judgment on just satisfaction 
was not possible. In Timofeyev’s view, this judgment only deepened the distance 
between Russia and Strasbourg and increased the chances of escalating the 
confrontation even farther. 
                                                          
131 Maxim Timofeyev “Money Makes the Court Go Round: The Russian Constitutional Court’s 
Yukos Judgment,” at http://verfassungsblog.de/money-makes-the-court-go-round-the-russian-
constitutional-courts-yukos-judgment/ (accessed on 29 January 2017). 
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The response of the ECtHR has so far been more muted. Also on 26 
January 2017, Guido Raimondi addressed the annual press conference of the 
ECtHR and answered a question concerning the Yukos judgment of the Russian 
CC. His answer has not been published by the court but can be seen and heard on 
the Court’s website.132 Mr. Raimondi made the point that enforcement of 
judgments is not a matter for the ECtHR but for the Committee of Ministers, 
which had the Yukos case under review. He also said that the Russian CC 
judgment had not yet been translated and that it would be studied closely in the 
ECtHR. 
His remarks were greeted with enthusiasm by Russia. The official Russian 
news agency TASS announced that “Strasbourg court chief says Russia fulfils 
95% of court’s rulings. Russia’s judicial authorities generally demonstrate their 
full readiness for cooperation with the Strasbourg court, the ECHR president 
said.”133 
TASS quoted Mr. Raimondi as follows134: 
Very much positive can be said about relations with the Russian 
Federation. The Court has excellent relations with the Russian judicial 
authorities. I made a visit to Russia in late 2016 and held quite fruitful 
negotiations, in particular, with Chairman of the Supreme Court Mr. Lebedev 
and Chairman of the Constitutional Court Mr. Zorkin. They have big willpower to 
cooperate with the ECHR and with the Council of Europe as a whole. We could 
state with Chairman Lebedev that the Supreme Court is carrying out excellent 
work for preparing judges and we know that Russia has a large judge corps, 
which depends on the Supreme Court’s preparation programs. In most cases, up 
to 95% of our court’s decisions are fulfilled duly in Russia and this is a positive 
aspect in Russia’s relations with the ECHR. 
At the time of writing, therefore, it is too soon to say what the final result will be. 
But it must be noted that Russia did not seek to appeal the Yukos judgment of the 
                                                          
132 https://vodmanager.coe.int/cedh/webcast/cedh/2017-01-26-1/lang (accessed on 30 
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ECtHR to the Grand Chamber, and some years have passed. It is unlikely that the 
Committee of Ministers will accept that Russia should not make proper 
arrangements to pay the amount of just satisfaction ordered by the ECtHR. 
6.7 Conclusion 
My argument in this chapter has been that the question of Russia’s relationship 
with the Strasbourg system and its implementation of judgments of the ECtHR is 
not satisfactorily answered by means of the “spiral model” of “socialization,” with 
its tendency to ascribe to a state the characteristics of a difficult adolescent, 
although of course these approaches have something of value to teach us. 
Instead, in my view, the history of Russia’s understanding of law and 
rights, and its complex and contradictory approaches to international law and 
human rights, is better read through the matrix of the intense and often 
scandalous debates and battles between conservatives and reformers, positivists 
and natural lawyers, taking new forms in every generation. Indeed, in that 
respect Russia is not qualitatively different from most other countries. It is 
somewhat similar to that other former imperial power, Great Britain. Both have 
suffered, and suffer to this day, acute crises of identity, especially when 
international instruments and mechanisms to which they have voluntarily 
acceded turn out to impinge on dearly held conceptions of sovereignty and 
national pride. 
So I conclude with a recent example in Russia. On 19 March 2015 Yelena 
Lukyanova, daughter of Anatoliy Lukyanov, a contemporary of Mikhail 
Gorbachev at Moscow State University’s Law School, and last speaker of the 
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USSR Supreme Soviet, herself a redoubtable advocate,135 and Professor of 
Constitutional Law at the National Research University – Higher School of 
Economics, published in Novaya Gazeta a 6,000-word forthright critique of the 
state of Russian law and the Russian CC in particular, on the issue of the 
annexation of Crimea. This was entitled “O Prave Nalevo (About law ‘on the 
side’).”136 
She located the heart of the problem in legal positivism, which became 
deeply rooted in Russia in the last decades of the nineteenth century and up until 
the 1920s. It was then a new idea, with its roots in Western Europe, and at that 
time part of a worldwide trend. She argued that Russia’s ratification of the ECHR 
in 1998 was problematic for Russian law precisely because of the difficulty of 
translating “rule of law” into Russian, which has a distinction between pravo, law 
in the sense of right, and zakon, positive law. Rather than the supremacy of law 
as understood in the ECHR, Russia proceeds according to verkhovenstvo bukvy 
zakona, supremacy of the letter of the law. This means, she said, that Russia lives 
in a different dimension to most contemporary states. As a result, there are two 
communities of lawyers: on the one hand legal bureaucrats, judges, 
parliamentarians, and law enforcement officials, and on the other hand, 
advocates, human rights defenders, and some independent academics. 
From this she turned to the Opredeleniye (Resolution) of the Russian CC 
of 19 March 2014, No. 6-P, “On the case of checking the constitutionality of the 
not yet in force international treaty between the Russian Federation and the 
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Republic of Crimea on accepting into the Russian Federation of the Republic of 
Crimea and the inclusion into the Russian Federation of new subjects.”137 At first 
glance, this seemed to be fine. On closer analysis, she found eight serious 
violations by the Russian CC of its own legislation procedure, case law, and 
international obligations. In her view this was a civilizational problem. She 
concluded her passionate article by quoting Zorkin himself: 
“If the law dies, then the world will be on the edge of the abyss,” he wrote. In 
many ways thanks to the court led by him we already find ourselves there. The 
inability to give an evaluation proceeding from belief in the spirit of law (pravo), 
the spirit of civilisation built on that law – that is barbarism. But barbarism can 
be healed. Not in a moment, but it can be healed. Actually quite simply. Through 
education and culture. 
Zorkin replied, explosively, with a 5,000-word riposte in the official Rossiiskaya 
Gazeta on 23 March 2015, entitled “The Law – and only the Law.”138 He started 
with personal abuse. He accused “Mrs. Lukyanova” of constantly trying to sit on 
two stools, pseudo-communist and pseudo-liberal, and constantly changing her 
position according to the conjuncture. His theme was the claim that the skrepy, 
“buckles” holding society together, were the legitimacy of the authorities and the 
law. He associated Lukyanova with “criminals” such as William Browder (whose 
lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, was murdered in a Russian SIZO, pretrial detention 
prison).139 He declared: 
Today we see on the side of the West and its Russian disciples 
falsifications, yet unseen in scale, of events in Ukraine and their context. We see 
that all official Western legal interpretations of these events persistently and 
unanimously identify Russia in the “circle of the guilty.”… For me this means 
that today our Russia is living through the latest invasion by Western (and their 
internal pro-Westerners) “civilised barbarians.” 
In her measured reply in an interview in Novaya Gazeta on 15 June 2015, “I have 
always tried to see things from his point of view, and to justify him,” she 
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responded to Zorkin’s use of the word “buckles (skrepy), and while pointing out 
that according to the law Zorkin had no business making such personal attacks, 
said that Zorkin who served for a number of years on the CoE’s Venice 
Commission for Democracy through Law140 must know better, and recalled that 
on the many occasions she had appeared before him at the Russian CC he had 
always treated her with courtesy and respect. 
She has now published a brochure #KRYMNASH. Spor o prave i o 
skrepkakh dvukh yuristov i ikh chitatelei (#OURCRIMEA141. The dispute about 
law and about “buckles” between two lawyers and their readers).142 
Even in the present very difficult circumstances in Russia, in which civil 
society is subjected to unprecedented (since 1991) persecution and Zorkin is 
one of the leading campaigners for the primacy of Russian sovereignty and 
security over human rights, the passionate debate over the nature and force of 
rights continues unabated. However, it may be that the recent Yukos judgment of 
the Russian CC provokes a final rupture in relations between Russia and the CoE. 
                                                          
140 http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN (accessed on 2 
January 2015). 
141 This is the hashtag for the Kremlin’s constantly repeated slogan glorifying the annexation of 
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